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I.

Introduction

After years of modest growth, drug spending has increased
dramatically. Spending in 2014 grew by over thirteen percent, the largest
annual increase since 2001. 1 On average, the prices of traditional brand
drugs grew by five to seven percent, 2 but prices on several high-profile
drugs have increased by as much as 3000 percent. 3 Even some generic
medications—the traditionally cheaper alternative to brand drugs—have

†

Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.

1.

IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, MEDICINE USE AND SPENDING SHIFTS: A REVIEW OF THE
USE OF MEDICINES IN THE U.S. IN 2014 5 (2015).

2.

Id. at 7.

3.

Aimee Picchi, Martin Shkreli-style Drug Price Hikes are Everywhere, CBS
MONEYWATCH (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/martin-shkreli-styledrug-price-hikes-are-everywhere/.
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experienced significant price increases. 4 This surge in drug spending has
been driven by the increasing popularity of expensive specialty drugs such
as biologics, higher prices on brand drugs, and fewer patent expirations that
open the door for cheaper generics. 5
In response to the sharp increase in spending and skyrocketing prices,
consumers, insurance plans, medical groups, and politicians are looking for
explanations and demanding change. 6 Reforms to curb further increases
have engendered rare cross-party alliances in Congress and even rarer
agreement among presidential candidates. 7 Proposed reforms include
allowing more government intervention in the Medicare Part D drug
program, 8 imposing direct price controls on drugs for lower-income
Medicare patients, 9 capping consumers’ out-of-pocket costs for drugs, 10
promoting generic competition, 11 and enhancing sanctions for
anticompetitive practices. 12
4.

See, e.g., Peter Jaret, Prices Spike for Some Generic Drugs, AARP BULLETIN (July, Aug.
2015), http://www.aarp.org/health/drugs-supplements/info-2015/prices-spikefor-generic-drugs.html; Trefis Team, Why are Generic Drug Prices Shooting Up?,
(Feb.
27,
2015),
FORBES
http://www.forbes.com/sites/greatspeculations/2015/02/27/why-are-genericdrug-prices-shooting-up/#25bc238a377e.

5.

IMS INSTITUTE, supra note 1, at 5-8.

6.

See, e.g., Richard Mark Kirkner, Drug Pricing Regulation Pushed from Many Sides,
CARE
(Jan.
2016),
MANAGED
http://www.managedcaremag.com/archives/2016/1/drug-pricing-regulationpushed-many-sides; Jeanne Whalen, Doctors Object to High Cancer-Drug Prices,
WALL ST. J. (Jul. 23, 2015), http://www.wsj.com/articles/doctors-object-to-highcancer-drug-prices-1437624060.

7.

See, e.g., Andrew Pollack, Drug Prices Soar, Prompting Calls for Justification, N.Y.
TIMES (July 23, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/23/business/drugcompanies-pushed-from-far-and-wide-to-explain-high-prices.html;
Thomas
Sullivan, Both Houses of Congress Investigating Prescription Drug Prices, POL’Y &
MED. (Nov. 06, 2015), http://www.policymed.com/2015/11/both-houses-ofcongress-investigating-prescription-drug-prices.html.

8.

Sy Mukherjee, Trump Joins Clinton, Sanders & Obama in Endorsing Medicare Drug
(Jan.
27,
2016),
Price
Negotiations,
BIOPHARMADIVE
http://www.biopharmadive.com/news/trump-joins-clinton-sanders-obama-inendorsing-medicare-drug-price-nego/412840/.

9.

Hillary Clinton’s Plan for Lowering Prescription Drug Costs, HILLARY FOR AM.,
https://www.hillaryclinton.com/briefing/factsheets/2015/09/21/hillary-clintonplan-for-lowering-prescription-drug-costs/ (last visited Feb. 13, 2016).

10.

Anne Gearan & Amy Goldstein, Clinton Proposing $250 Monthly Cap on
Prescription Drug Costs for Patients, WASH. POST (Sept. 22, 2015),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-politics/wp/2015/09/22/clintonproposing-250-monthly-cap-on-prescription-drug-costs-for-patients/.

11.

Allison Gilchrist, Senate Scrutinizes Generic Drug Approval Backlog, PHARMACY TIMES
(Feb. 4, 2016), http://www.pharmacytimes.com/news/senate-scrutinizesgeneric-drug-approval-backlog.

12.

See, e.g., Kirkner, supra note 6.
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In this article, I explain why reforms promoting competition will
produce better results and fewer negative consequences than reforms
imposing new price controls. Price controls are government-mandated
limits on prices or government-required discounts on prices. Basic
economic principles, past experience, and empirical data indicate that new
price controls will likely increase drug prices for some consumers, slow
pharmaceutical innovation, curtail generic competition, and reduce patient
access to certain medications. In contrast, reforms aimed at promoting
competition or prohibiting anticompetitive practices will expand product
offerings, lower drug prices for more patients, and incentivize innovation.
The article proceeds as follows: in Section II, I outline several demandside and supply-side developments that have significantly impacted the
pharmaceutical industry in recent decades. The nature of competition
between brand drug companies and generic companies has changed
dramatically as generics have increased their market share from nineteen
percent to over eighty-eight percent of drugs sold in the United States.
Brand companies now realize few sales after their patents expire and
generics enter the market. At the same time that brand companies have
lost market share and profits to generics, they have also seen increased
power from pharmaceutical buyers—namely drug plans and pharmacybenefit managers (“PBMs”). PBMs and drug plans now largely determine
what consumers pay for drugs, what pharmacies they use, and what drugs
they take, which has diminished drug companies’ influence over prices.
Drug companies have also experienced significant increases in both the
costs of drug development leading to approval by the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) and the risks of product failures. The costs to bring
a drug to market have increased from less than $200 million to over two
billion dollars, 13 and only one in ten drugs that begin clinical trials is
eventually approved by the FDA. 14 As the development costs for traditional
drugs have increased, drug manufacturers have shifted much of their
research and development efforts toward biologic products. 15 Although
these complex drugs did not enter the market until the 1980s, they now
comprise over a quarter of all drug spending in the United States. 16
Unfortunately, because of their high costs of development and production

13.

See HENRY G. GRABOWSKI & RONALD W. HANSEN., BRIEFING: COST OF DEVELOPING A NEW
DRUG (2014).

14.

Michael Hay et al., Clinical Development Success Rates for Investigational Drugs,
31 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 40, 44 (2014).

15.

See generally Shannon Gibson et al., Why the Shift? Taking a Closer Look at the
Growing Interest in Niche Markets and Personalized Medicine, 7 WORLD MED.
HEALTH POL’Y 3, 3 (2015).

16.

Andrew Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit Generics, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-instates-on-generic-copies-of-biotech-drugs.html?_r=0.
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and lack of competitors to control prices, biologic drugs are prohibitively
expensive for many consumers. 17
In Section III, I describe existing government programs that impose
price controls in the pharmaceutical industry and explain the likely
consequences of further controls. As of 2005, over twenty percent of drugs
sold in the U.S. were sold under government programs that mandate price
controls, such as Medicaid, the 340B Program, the Department of Defense
and Veterans Affairs programs, and spending in the coverage gap of
Medicare Part D. 18 Some programs even require drugs to be sold for a
penny. 19 Further price controls will create incentives for manufacturers to
charge higher prices to non-covered patients to offset the discounted
prices. If manufacturers are not able to offset discounts by increasing prices
for non-covered consumers, all consumers may ultimately suffer. Empirical
data suggest that price controls contribute to drug shortages, slow
innovation, and curtail generic competition. 20 Ultimately, price controls
meant to lower drug spending for some consumers could end up harming
all consumers.
Rather than restraining prices through price controls, the government
should promote competition to reduce drug prices. In Section IV, I discuss
the many actions the government could take to increase competition in the
pharmaceutical industry. Reducing the generic-approval backlog at the FDA
will increase generic competition for drugs, expediting affordable biosimilar
alternatives to biologics will lower prices for many specialty medications,
and targeting anticompetitive behavior will promote competition
throughout the industry. By increasing competition, these actions will
expand product offerings to consumers, lower prices as suppliers compete
to attain or protect valuable market share from rivals, and foster innovation
as drug companies strive to create new products to stay ahead of
competitors.
The recent surge in drug spending must be addressed to ensure that
patients can continue to afford life-saving and life-enhancing medications.
17.

Anthony D. So & Samuel L. Katz, Biologics Boondoggle, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/08/opinion/08so.html (explaining “biologic
medicines, which cost, on average, 22 times as much as ordinary drugs.”).

18.

See Jordan Rau, Medicare reveals how much it spends on prescription drugs for
NEWSHOUR
(May
1,
2015,
8:32
AM),
Americans,
PBS
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/rundown/medicare-reveals-much-spendsprescription-drugs-americans/.

19.

DEP’T. HEALTH & HUM. SERV., CLARIFICATION OF PENNY PRICING POLICY (2011), available at
https://www.hrsa.gov/opa/programrequirements/policyreleases/pennypricingcl
arification112111.pdf.

20.

Patricia Earl & Phillip L. Zweig, Connecting the Dots: How Anticompetitive
Contracting Practices, Kickbacks, and Self-dealing by Hospital Group Purchasing
Organizations (GPOs) Caused the U.S. Drug Shortage, CARE & COST (2012),
https://careandcost.com/2012/02/14/connecting-the-dots-howanticompetitive-contracting-practices-kickbacks-and-self-dealing-by-hospitalgroup-purchasing-organizations-gpos-caused-the-u-s-drug-shortage/.
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However, imposing new price controls on pharmaceuticals will produce
negative consequences—less innovation, drug shortages, fewer product
choices, and higher prices for some consumers—that could harm
consumers rather than helping them. In contrast, promoting competition
will lower pharmaceutical prices and drug spending without these
deleterious effects.

II.

Recent Developments in the Pharmaceutical Industry

The pharmaceutical industry has steadily expanded over the last
several decades. Global revenue for the industry was approximately one
trillion dollars in 2015, compared to approximately $340 billion in 1989. 21
The United States alone spent over $400 billion on pharmaceuticals in
2015. 22
During this period of expansion, the pharmaceutical industry has
undergone significant changes that have altered the nature of competition
in the industry, shifted the relative bargaining power of drug sellers and
drug buyers, and increased the costs of developing and selling drugs. In this
section, I outline several demand-side and supply-side developments that
have significantly impacted the pharmaceutical industry in recent decades.
A. Demand-Side Developments: Generic Competition and Pharmacy Benefit
Managers

The nature of competition in the pharmaceutical industry has changed
dramatically over the past several decades as brand companies have lost
significant market share to generics. The generic industry exploded after
the Hatch-Waxman Act in 1984 created an abbreviated regulatory process
that encouraged companies to produce and market cheaper, generic
drugs. 23 First, to spur the introduction of low-cost generics, Hatch-Waxman
created the Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) process that
allows a generic that demonstrates bioequivalence to rely on previously
submitted brand-name safety and efficacy data. 24 This greatly truncated
process enables generic manufacturers to quickly enter the market after
21.

THOMSON REUTERS, Global Pharma Sales to Reach $1.3 Trillion (Aug. 4, 2015),
http://thomsonreuters.com/en/articles/2015/global-pharma-sales-reach-above1-trillion.html; Vivian Hunt et al., A Wake-up Call for Big Pharma, MCKINSEY & CO.
(Dec.
2011),
http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/a_wakeup_call_for_big_pharma.

22.

IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, GLOBAL MEDICINES USE IN 2020: OUTLOOK AND
IMPLICATIONS 35 (2015), available at http://www.imshealth.com/en/thoughtleadership/ims-institute/reports/global-medicines-use-in-2020.

23.

Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984); U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL
INDUSTRY, ix (1998).

24.

21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2016).
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the brand drug’s patent expires. Moreover, Hatch-Waxman actively
incentivizes generic companies to challenge brand patents’ validity by
creating a pathway for such challenges and by offering a lucrative incentive
to the first generic manufacturer that files an ANDA claiming that the brand
patent is either invalid or will not be infringed by the new generic. If the
generic company wins or settles the patent litigation, it receives a 180-day
exclusivity period during which the FDA will not approve any other generic
versions of the drug, a period in which the first generic can earn substantial
profits by shadow pricing the innovator’s price. 25
Generics have been further aided by drug substitution laws in every
state that allow, or even require, pharmacists to automatically substitute a
generic equivalent drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand
drug. 26 These regulatory changes have allowed generics to capture
significant market share from brand companies. 27 As shown in Figure 1,
whereas generics comprised only nineteen percent of all drugs dispensed
prior to 1984, they now represent over eighty-eight percent of prescriptions
filled.

Generic Market Share
100%
80%

88%
72%

60%
40%
20%
0%

33%

43%

52%

19%
1984

1990

1996

2002

2008

2014

Figure 1. Growth in Generics’ Share of Pharmaceutical Market 28

25.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUM. SERV., GUIDANCE FOR INDUSTRY: 180-DAY GENERIC
DRUG EXCLUSIVITY UNDER THE HATCH-WAXMAN AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL FOOD, DRUG, &
COSMETIC ACT (1998).

26.

BUREAU CONSUMER PROT., DRUG PRODUCT SELECTION: STAFF REPORT TO THE FEDERAL TRADE
COMM’N at 48, 150, 153 (1979).

27.

U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFF., supra note 23, at ix.

28.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-371R, DRUG PRICING: RESEARCH ON SAVINGS
FROM GENERIC DRUG USE 2 (2012); IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, DECLINING
MEDICINE USE AND COSTS: FOR BETTER OR WORSE? A REVIEW OF THE USE OF MEDICINES IN THE
UNITED
STATES
IN
2012,
at
15
(2013),
available
at
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The increased competition from generics puts downward pressure on
prices, generating significant cost savings for consumers. After the patent
expiry of a brand drug, generics enter the market at a significantly lower
price. Data show that generics enter the market at a price fifty percent less
than their brand counterpart. 29 As more generics enter the market, the
price eventually drops to eighty percent off the pre-expiry brand prices. 30
This lower price directly reduces spending for consumers. Indeed, the surge
of cheaper generic products in recent years has produced significant savings
for consumers; in the last decade alone, generic drugs have saved the
healthcare system over one trillion dollars. 31
Moreover, the speed at which customers switch from brand drugs to
their generic counterparts is significantly faster than it was several decades
ago. As shown in Figure 2, upon market entry, generics routinely capture
over seventy percent of the brand drug’s market within only three months.
In contrast, as recently as 1999, generics captured less than forty percent
of the market within three months. Within twelve months, generics now
capture over eighty percent of the brand drug’s market share, whereas in
1999, they captured slightly over fifty percent.

http://static.correofarmaceutico.com/docs/2013/05/20/usareport.pdf; PHRMA,
CHARTPACK: BIOPHARMACEUTICALS IN PERSPECTIVE 56 (2016), available at
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/chartpack-2015.pdf.
29.

IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE INFORMATICS, PRICE DECLINES
EXCLUSIVITY IN THE U.S 3 (2016).

30.

Id.

31.

U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 28, at 4.
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Figure 2. Generic Erosion of Brand Drug Market Share 32

As a result of this swift erosion of their market share, brand
pharmaceutical firms realize few sales after they reach the patent cliff and
generics enter the market. 33 An early study by the U.S. Congressional
Budget Office found that during the first decade after the Hatch-Waxman
Act, total net revenues generated by new drugs declined by twelve percent
as a result of generic entry. 34 Between 2012 and 2018, it is estimated that
pharmaceutical companies will lose almost $150 billion in revenues
because of patent expirations. 35
However, generic erosion of brand profits and the accompanying price
reductions are somewhat cyclical because they depend on patent
expirations. The first generic entrants in a market earn substantial profits
as consumers immediately switch from brand drugs to the generic
competitor. However, as more generics enter a market, the market share
and profits of any individual generic manufacturer decline. Thus, patent
expirations and the promise of significant profits for the first generic
competitors incentivize generic entry. Conversely, fewer patent expirations
result in less generic entry and, in turn, less price reduction. For example,
reduced brand innovation in the mid-1990s resulted in fewer patent

32.

Henry Grabowski et al., Recent Trends in Brand Name and Generic Drug
Competition, 17 J. MED ECON. 207, 207 (2013).

33.

VanEck, Drug Patent Expirations: $190 Billion in Sales Up for Grabs, MARKET REALIST
(Mar. 3, 2016, 1:58PM), http://marketrealist.com/2016/03/drug-patentexpirations-190-billion-sales-grabs/.

34.

U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 23, at 38.

35.

PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, FROM VISION TO DECISION: PHARMA 2020, at 6 (2012),
available
at
http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/pharma-lifesciences/pharma2020/assets/pwc-pharma-success-strategies.pdf.
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expirations of brand drugs between 2013 and 2015, 36 and in turn, less
generic entry. 37
At the same time that brand companies have lost market share to
generics, they have also faced increased power from pharmaceutical
buyers. PBMs, which administer the prescription drug coverage for over
ninety-five percent of insured Americans, 38 have adopted various benefit
changes and tools to reduce pharmaceutical prices and steer patients to
less-expensive alternatives. 39 For example, PBMs have successfully reduced
drug spending by requiring substitution of generic drugs for brand name
drugs when clinically appropriate. 40 Many PBMs also offer mail-order
pharmacy services that lower drug prices by ensuring that consumers are
dispensed the cheapest drug within a therapeutic class, which is often a
generic. 41
PBMs also employ tiered formularies—a list of approved or preferred
drugs for the health plan—and direct consumers to the formulary drugs
with incentives, such as lower copayments. Because formulary status can
greatly influence the sales of a drug, PBMs are able to negotiate significant
discounts from drug manufacturers in exchange for a formulary listing. 42
Once on the formulary, drugs are assigned to one of several tiers based on
their cost to the health plan. 43 For example, whereas a non-formulary drug
may cost a beneficiary one hundred dollars, drugs in the generic tier of the
formulary could cost ten dollars and drugs in the brand tier of the formulary
could cost thirty dollars. The tiered copayments and coinsurance give
beneficiaries a powerful incentive to use generic or low-cost brand-name
medications.

36.

See IMS INST., supra note 28, at 16.

37.

Katie Thomas, Generic Drug Makers See a Drought Ahead, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3,
2012),
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/04/business/generic-drug-makersfacing-squeeze-on-revenue.html?_r=0.

38.

Federal Trade Commission, Letter to Senator Richard L. Brown, North Dakota
Senate,
4
(March
8,
2005),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/2005/03/050311northdakotacomnts.pdf.

39.

See Dan Goldman et al., Prescription Drug Cost Sharing: Associations With
Medication and Medical Utilization and Spending and Health, 298 J. AM. MED. 61,
61 (2007).

40.

See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, EFFECTS OF USING PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS ON
HEALTH PLANS, ENROLLEES, AND PHARMACIES 28 (2003).

41.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, PHARMACY BENEFIT MANAGERS: OWNERSHIP OF MAIL-ORDER
PHARMACIES 23-40 (2005).

42.

Federal Trade Commission, Letter to Assembly Member Greg Aghazarian,
California General Assembly, 6-7 (September 7, 2004), available at
http://www.ftc.gov/be/V040027.pdf.

43.

FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 41, at 6-7.
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These and other innovative tools have saved Americans billions of
dollars each year. 44 However, they have also dramatically changed the
landscape of the pharmaceutical market by lessening drug companies’
influence over prices. In the 1970s, most prescription drugs were prescribed
by doctors that were largely insensitive to price, methodically filled by
pharmacists, and paid for by consumers or, less frequently, by third-party
payors that had little influence over the drug chosen or the price paid. 45 As
a consequence, drug manufacturers had enormous control over price. In
contrast, the market for prescription drugs in 2016 is one in which the PBMs
and drug plans have harnessed the buying clout of millions of consumers to
negotiate discounted prescription drug prices. 46 PBMs and drug plans now
largely determine what consumers pay for drugs, which pharmacies they
use, and which drugs they take. 47 As a result, PBMs and drug plans have
replaced drug manufacturers in the driver’s seat when it comes to
determining prices.
B. Supply-Side Developments: Increasing Costs and Biologic Drugs

At the same time that generics and PBMs have decreased the demand
for brand drugs, drug companies have also experienced significant
increases in the costs of drug development leading to FDA approval and the
risks of product failures. Since the 1962 amendments to the Federal Food,
Drug, and Cosmetic Act (“FDCA”), the FDA has continued to increase the
requirements for new-drug approvals. For example, whereas clinical trials
in the 1970s typically only enrolled 2000 patients, trials in the 1990s
regularly enrolled over 5000 patients. 48 Similarly, the costs of recruiting
patients, the length of the clinical-trial period, and the number and
complexity of clinical tests used in clinical trials have increased over time. 49
These more-stringent requirements, along with the more-complex science
associated with specialized medications, have significantly increased the
44.

U.S. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, ISSUES IN DESIGNING A PRESCRIPTION DRUG BENEFIT FOR MEDICARE
40 (2002) (Estimating of the magnitude of PBMs’ cost-savings range from 30
percent to 35 percent of total prescription drug spending); Pharmacy Benefit
Managers (PBMs): Generating Savings for Plan Sponsors and Consumers, VISANTE
5 (2011), http://thatswhatpbmsdo.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/visantepbm-savings-study-Feb-2016.pdf.

45.

See Michael A. Carrier, A Real-World Analysis of Pharmaceutical Settlements: The
Missing Dimension of Product Hopping, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1009, 1011, 1077-1120
(2010).

46.

Thomas Gryta, What is a ‘Pharmacy Benefit Manager?’, WALL ST. J. (July 21, 2011),
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424053111903554904576460322664055
328.html.

47.

Id.

48.

Henry Grabowski, The Evolution of the Pharmaceutical Industry Over the
Past 50 Years: A Personal Reflection, 18 INT. J. ECON. BUS. 161, 169 (2011).

49.

Id.; Kenneth A. Getz et al., Variability in Protocol Design Complexity by Phase and
Therapeutic Area, 45 DRUG INFORM. J. 413 (2011).
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Millions of 2013
dollars

costs of drug development and FDA approval. The most current estimates
indicate that it now costs approximately $2.6 billion to develop and bring
each new drug to market. 50 However, as shown in Figure 3, those costs were
estimated to be $179 million in the 1970s; 51 $413 million in the 1980s, 52 and
$1.04 billion in the 1990s and early 2000s. 53 In contrast, it costs generic
manufacturers only one to two million dollars to bring a drug to market. 54
$3,000
$2,500
$2,000
$1,500
$1,000
$500
$0

$2.6 B

$179 M

$413 M

1970s

1980s

$1.04 B

1990s-early 2000s-early
2000s
2010s

Figure 3. The Cost of Bringing a New Drug to Market

Moreover, only about ten percent of brand drugs that begin clinical
trials are eventually approved by the FDA. The most recent study to track
FDA approval rates found that the approval rate varied by trial phase: phase
I had a 64.5 percent success rate, phase II had a 32.4 percent success rate,
phase III had a 60.1 percent success rate, and the FDA approved 83.2
percent of applications that passed phase III. 55 Ultimately, of one hundred

50.

GRABOWSKI & HANSEN, supra note 13.

51.

Ronald W. Hansen, The Pharmaceutical Development Process: Estimates of
Current Development Costs and Times and the Effects of Regulatory Changes, in
ISSUES IN PHARMACEUTICAL ECONOMICS, 151 (R. I. Chien, ed., 1979).

52.

GRABOWSKI & HANSEN, supra note 13 (as shown in graph titled “Growth in
Capitalized R&D Costs per Approved New Compound”).

53.

Joseph A. DiMasi et al., The Price of Innovation: New Estimates of Drug
Development Costs, 22 J. HEALTH ECON. 151, 181 (2003).

54.

See Brief for Federal Trade Commission as Amicus Curiae, Mylan Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. Warner Chilcott Public Limited Company, 2012 WL 7649225 (2012) No. 123824.

55.

Hay et al., supra note 14, at 41 (Stating phase I trials—usually including 20-80
healthy subjects and lasting 1-3 months—focus on the safety of the drug and
determine the metabolic and pharmacologic actions of drugs, side effects of
increasing doses, and early evidence of effectiveness. Phase II trials—usually
including 100-300 subjects and lasting 1-2 years—focus on the drug’s
effectiveness. Phase III verifies the drug’s efficacy and safety with 1,000-3,000
subjects suffering from the disease and lasts 1-4 years). The study used data from
2003-2011 and included both new drug applications and biologic license
applications. Id. at 40.
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drugs that begin Phase I trials, only ten drugs will eventually be approved.56
As a result, drug-approval rates have increased little in recent decades,
despite dramatic increases in research and development (“R&D”) spending.
Figure 4 illustrates these disparate trends.
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Even after FDA approval, pharmaceutical manufacturers increasingly
face patent challenges that reduce the likelihood that drugs will achieve
commercial success. Hatch-Waxman actively incentivizes generic
companies to challenge the validity of brand-name patents by creating a
pathway for such challenges and by offering a lucrative incentive to the first
generic manufacturer that files a challenge—known as a Paragraph IV
challenge—claiming that the brand patent is either invalid or will not be

56.

Id. at 41.

57.

4
(2015),
Annual
Membership
Survey,
PHRMA
http://www.phrma.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2015phrma_profile_membership_results.pdf (showing industry R&D spending in 2014
dollars and based on members of the PhRMA trade association); FOOD & DRUG
ADMIN., Summary of NDA Approvals & Receipts, 1938 to the Present, FDA.GOV,
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/summaryof
ndaapprovalsreceipts1938tothepresent/default.htm (noting that drug approvals
from 1980-2011 include new molecular entities, including both chemicals and
biologics) (last updated Jan. 18, 2013); FOOD & DRUG ADMIN. CTR. DRUG EVAL. &
RESEARCH, NOVEL DRUGS 2015 3 (2016) (noting that data from 2012-2014 is from the
U.S. Food and Drug Administration).
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infringed by the new generic. 58 If the generic company wins or settles the
patent litigation, it receives a 180-day exclusivity period during which the
FDA will not approve any other generic versions of the drug, a period in
which the first generic can earn substantial profits. 59 As a result of these
incentives, Paragraph IV challenges have exploded in recent years; whereas
only nine percent of drugs facing generic entry in 1995 were challenged,
eighty-one percent of drugs facing generic entry in 2012 were challenged. 60
Moreover, Paragraph IV challenges are occurring earlier in the life of brand
drugs. Drugs entering the market as generics in 1995 faced their first
challenge 18.7 years after original launch. 61 By comparison, drugs entering
the market as generics in 2012 saw only 6.9 years between market launch
and the first Paragraph IV challenge. 62 These challenges threaten a drug’s
commercial success and cost pharmaceutical companies significant legal
fees.
Moreover, in 2012 the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act gave generics
a new administrative venue to challenge patents, the inter partes review
(“IPR”). 63 IPR challenges replaced inter partes re-examinations to facilitate
patent challenges by offering a quicker, more-efficient, and less-expensive
procedure. 64 Indeed, data show that generics and other parties are taking
advantage of the new pathway; the number of IPR challenges to
pharmaceutical patents continues to increase, with twice as many
challenges filed in 2015 compared to 2014. 65
The competition from generics, increasing power of PBMs, increasing
R&D costs, and risk of patent challenges mean that many pharmaceuticals
will never attain commercial success. Even for the ten percent of drugs that
receive FDA approval, only twenty percent will ever earn enough revenue

58.

Margo Bagley, Patent Term Restoration and Non-Patent Exclusivity in the U.S., in
PHARMACEUTICAL INNOVATION, COMPETITION, AND PATENT LAW 111, 116-117 (Josef Drexel
& Nari Lee eds., 2013).

59.

See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 25, at 4.

60.

Grabowski et al., supra note 32, at 106.

61.

Id.

62.

Id.

63.

Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat at 299–305 (2011)
(setting forth procedures for IPR).

64.

See Joanna Shepherd, Disrupting the Balance: The Conflict between HatchWaxman and Inter Partes Review, N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENTM’T L. (forthcoming
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2838236 (giving a
full explanation of IPR and the administrative proceedings it replaced).

65.

See Stephen Maebius, Bio/Pharma IPR Challenges Nearly Double in 2015, PTAB
TRIAL
INSIGHTS
(July
28,
2015),
https://www.ptabtrialinsights.com/2015/07/biopharma-ipr-challenges-nearlydouble-in-2015-cabilly-415-patent-challenged/.
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to cover the growing R&D costs. 66 Moreover, the likelihood that a drug will
become profitable has decreased over time as the risk of failure and
development costs have increased. 67 The average lifetime revenues for new
drugs are lower now than at any point in the last twenty-five years. 68
As the development costs for traditional drugs have increased, drug
manufacturers have shifted much of their research and development
efforts toward biologic products. Biologics primarily distinguish themselves
from traditional drugs by their origins: they derive from living organisms,
typically proteins, though occasionally including toxins, blood, viruses, or
allergens. 69 These medications are far more complex than traditional
medicines. Whereas a traditional drug might contain between a few dozen
to one hundred atoms per molecule, a biologic’s complicated proteins can
include from several thousand to tens of thousands of atoms per
molecule. 70
Biologics are comparatively new, relative to traditional drugs; the FDA
cleared the first biologic for human use, human insulin, in 1982. 71 However,
by 2013, spending on biologic drugs comprised a quarter of all drug
spending in the U.S. 72 This spending is expected to grow at an annual rate
of over ten percent, eventually reaching over $386 billion in 2019. 73
Biologic drugs are currently prohibitively expensive for many
consumers. The average cost of a biologic drug is twenty-two times greater
than a traditional drug. 74 The average annual cost of a biologic drug is
estimated to be $34,550, 75 but annual costs for many biologic drugs exceed
66.

John A. Vernon et al., Drug Development Costs When Financial Risk is Measured
Using the Fama‐French Three‐Factor Model, 19 HEALTH ECON. 1002, 1004 (2010).

67.

Ernst Berndt et al., Decline in Economic Returns from New Drugs Raises Questions
about Sustaining Innovations, 34 HEALTH AFFAIRS 245, 251-2 (2015).

68.

See generally PhRMA, supra note 57, at 3.

69.

Jason Kanter & Robin Feldman, Understanding & Incentivizing Biosimilars, 58
HASTINGS L.J. 57, 59 (2012) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(I) (2006)).

70.

See, e.g., Joan Kerber-Walker, Small Molecules, Large Biologics, and the Biosimilar
Debate, ARIZ. BIOINDUSTRY ASS’N. (Feb. 18, 2013), http://www.azbio.org/smallmolecules-large-biologics-and-the-biosimilar-debate.

71.

See JUDITH A. JOHNSON, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, FDA REGULATION OF FOLLOW-ON
BIOLOGICS 1 (2010) [hereinafter CRS FDA REPORT].

72.

Andrew Pollack, Biotech Firms, Billions at Risk, Lobby States to Limit Generics, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/29/business/battle-instates-on-generic-copies-of-biotech-drugs.html; see also IMS INST. FOR HEALTHCARE
INFORMATICS, MEDICINE USE AND SHIFTING COSTS OF HEALTHCARE: A REVIEW OF THE USE OF
MEDICINES IN THE UNITED STATES IN 2013, at 30 (2014).

73.

BCC RESEARCH, REPORT OVERVIEW: BIOLOGIC THERAPEUTIC DRUGS: TECHNOLOGIES AND GLOBAL
MARKETS, No. BIO079C (2015).

74.

So & Katz, supra note 17.

75.

Erwin A. Blackstone & Joseph P. Fuhr, Jr., Innovation and Competition: Will
Biosimilars Succeed? 9 BIOTECHNOLOGY HEALTHCARE 24, 26 (2012).
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$200,000. 76 Moreover, by requiring large patient coinsurance for specialty
drugs, such as biologics, most consumers’ prescription-drug insurance
coverage fails to fully defray these massive costs. 77 As a result, many
consumers cannot afford to obtain these life-saving or life-enhancing drugs.
Fortunately, Congress has recognized the need for cheaper, biosimilar
versions of biologic drugs. Similar to generic versions of traditional drugs,
biosimilars are close substitutes for brand biologic drugs that can be sold at
a lower price after the brand biologic’s patent expires. 78 As part of the
Affordable Care Act (“ACA”), Congress created a biosimilar-approval
pathway that would enable these cheaper biologic drugs to obtain FDA
approval and reach patients more quickly. 79 Consumers stand to benefit
significantly from the new market competition from lower-cost, but
similarly effective, biosimilars; in fact, estimates suggest this competition
could save consumers $250 billion over the next decade. 80
However, the FDA has, thus far, been slow to approve biosimilars,
approving only three biosimilar drugs to date. 81 Furthermore, the FDA has
yet to issue guidance on how biosimilars should prove they are
interchangeable with biologics. 82 Burdensome requirements for
interchangeability will increase the difficulty and cost of biosimilar
76.

Francis Megerlin et al., Biosimilars and The European Experience: Implications For
The United States, 32 HEALTH AFF. 1803 (2013).

77.

See, e.g., Leigh Purvis, Senior Strategic Policy Advisor, AARP, Presentation for FTC
Biosimilars Workshop on Naming Proposals and Impact on Competition at 8-12
(Feb.
4,
2014),
available
at
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislative%
20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition/purvis.pd
f.

78.

HRI’s Top Ten Health Industry Issues of 2016, Issue 9: Biosimilars,
(2016),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/healthPRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS
industries/top-health-industry-issues/biosimilars.html.

79.

Id.

80.

See, e.g., Steve Miller, Senior Vice President, Express Scripts, Presentation for FTC
Biosimilars Workshop on Naming Proposals and Impact on Competition, at 7 (Feb.
available
at
4,
2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislative%
20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition/miller.pd
f.

81.

See Zachary Brennan, FDA Approves Third Biosimilar in US, First for Amgen’s
Blockbuster Enbrel, REGULATORY AFF. PROF’L SOC’Y (Aug. 30, 2016),
http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/08/30/25739/FDAApproves-Third-Biosimilar-in-US-First-for-Amgens-Blockbuster-Enbrel/.

82.

Zachary Brennan, FDA Likely to Require Substantial Clinical Data for
Interchangeable Biosimilars, Lawyers Say, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROF’L SOC’Y (Jan. 12,
2016), http://www.raps.org/Regulatory-Focus/News/2016/01/12/23887/FDALikely-to-Require-Substantial-Clinical-Data-for-Interchangeable-BiosimilarsLawyers-Say/.
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approval, restricting the savings possible from biosimilar competition.
Moreover, even when the FDA approves a biosimilar, there may be
protracted patent challenges that significantly delay its availability to
patients. 83
C. Changes in the Pharmaceutical Industry’s Organizational Structure

With the intensifying competition from generics, expanding power
from PBMs, increasing costs of R&D, and growing risk of commercial failure,
the pharmaceutical industry has undergone significant structural change.
Several large pharmaceutical companies have merged to offset losses in
market share and achieve cost savings from greater economies of scale. 84
Indeed, the number of pharmaceutical companies earning more than five
billion dollars in annual profits has shrunk in the last two decades. 85 This
consolidation has achieved some efficiencies and increased short-term
earnings. 86
Similarly, the generic industry has experienced recent consolidation in
response to the reduction in patent expirations and exclusivity periods.
Many generic companies have merged, while others have acquired brand
companies to diversify their risk and reliance on generic drugs. 87
But at the same time the pharmaceutical industry has experienced
greater horizontal consolidation, it has also seen more vertical
disintegration. Until the mid-1970s, the industry was dominated by large
firms that generally kept most divisions in house; from R&D, production,
and regulatory affairs to marketing, they were fully vertically integrated. 88
Moreover, the firms generally financed their own R&D expenditures, using
primarily internal finance and, sometimes, bank loans. 89 However, in the
1980s, the importance of biotechnology startups and development-stage
firms with venture-capital financing expanded. 90 These firms positioned
themselves as a specialized layer between academic-research institutions

83.

See Peter Loftus, Panel Recommends FDA Approval of Remicade Knockoff, WALL
ST. J. (Feb. 10, 2016), http://www.wsj.com/articles/panel-recommends-fdaapproval-of-remicade-knockoff-1455057993.

84.

Grabowski, supra note 48, at 173.

85.

Hunt et al., supra note 21.

86.

Grabowski, supra note 48, at 173.

87.

Cynthia Koons, Teva’s Just the Start as More Generic Drugmakers Poised to Merge,
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2015), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-0805/teva-s-just-the-start-as-more-generic-drugmakers-poised-to-merge.

88.

Grabowski, supra note 48, at 162.

89.

See id. at 170.

90.

Iain M. Cockburn, The Changing Structure Of The Pharmaceutical Industry, 23
HEALTH AFFAIRS 10, 15-16 (2004).
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and pharmaceutical companies, and slowly evolved into important
suppliers of cutting-edge technology to pharmaceutical companies. 91
Now, instead of developing new products in their own R&D facilities,
large pharmaceutical firms increasingly seek alliances with biotechnology
and development-stage firms for new technologies and a broader R&D
pipeline. 92 The advantages of these smaller firms—proximity to academic
research, a less bureaucratic structure, and a higher tolerance for risk—
gives them a comparative advantage in drug research. 93 In contrast, the
large pharmaceutical firms specialize in large-scale clinical trial design,
manufacturing, marketing, and coordination with regulatory authorities. 94
Pharmaceutical companies increasingly rely on the research conducted by
biotechnology companies, with as much of forty percent of pharmaceutical
sales now coming from drugs that originated in biotechnology companies. 95
This outsourcing of drug development to biotechnology companies over the
last several decades has contributed to biotechnology’s significantly higher
growth rates compared to traditional pharmaceutical companies. 96

III.

Price Controls in the Pharmaceutical Industry

Politicians have recently called for price controls on pharmaceutical
prices. Price controls are government-mandated limits on prices or
government-required discounts on prices. 97 Hillary Clinton has called for
price controls for lower-income Medicare patients 98 and President Trump
joined Clinton, Bernie Sanders, and President Obama in calling for more
government intervention in the Medicare Part D program. 99 This section will
describe existing government programs that utilize price controls in the
pharmaceutical industry and explain the likely consequences of further
controls.
A.

Existing Price Controls

In this section, I discuss the largest public drug programs that utilize
price controls—Medicaid, the 340B program, Department of Defense
(“DOD”) and Veterans Affairs (“VA”) programs, and spending in the
91.

Id. at 16.

92.

Grabowski, supra note 48, at 165-66.

93.

Id. at 165.

94.

Id.

95.

Cockburn, supra note 90, at 16.

96.

Hunt et al., supra note 21.

97.

ECON.
&
LIBERTY,
See
Price
Controls,
LIBRARY
http://www.econlib.org/library/Topics/College/pricecontrols.html (last visited
Apr. 1, 2017).

98.

See, e.g., HILLARY FOR AM., supra note 9.

99.

Mukherjee, supra note 8.
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coverage gap of Medicare Part D. These public programs accounted for over
forty percent of the drug spending in non-hospital settings in 2014. 100 As a
result of their wide coverage, manufacturers have little choice but to
participate in the public programs. Moreover, it is difficult for
manufacturers to pick and choose among programs; the Department of
Health and Human Services (“HHS”) requires participants in Medicaid to
also make drugs available under the 340B, DOD, and VA programs. 101
In order to sell drugs to consumers covered by these public programs,
manufacturers must agree to offer certain rebates or discounts on drug
prices. The calculations are generally based on the average manufacturer
price (“AMP”)—the average price wholesalers pay manufacturers for drugs
that are sold to retail pharmacies—or the best price (“BP”)—the lowest
price at which the manufacturer offers the drug to any purchaser, including
all rebates and discounts.
1. Medicaid

Created in 1965, the Medicaid program provides health insurance for
low- income and medically needy individuals. 102 The specific methodology
used to determine the required rebate depends upon whether the drug is
a brand drug, generic drug, a clotting-factor drug, or an exclusively pediatric
drug. 103 For example, for brand-name drugs, the required rebate is the
greater of 23.1 percent of the AMP or the difference between the AMP and
the BP. 104 That is, brand manufacturers are required to sell drugs for 23.1
percent off the AMP, or, if they offer the drug for an even lower price to
any other purchaser, they must match that price for Medicaid. The effect of
this best price requirement is to penalize manufacturers who discount their
products in private negotiations.
The Affordable Care Act significantly expanded Medicaid eligibility. 105
Whereas 34.2 million people were covered by Medicaid in 1995, by 2014,
100. See, e.g., U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Nat’l Health Expenditures Data,
CMS.GOV, at Table 4 (2015), https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-andSystems/Statistics-Trends-andReports/NationalHealthExpendData/NationalHealthAccountsHistorical.html.
101. See U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MEDICAID DRUG REBATE PROGRAM (2015)
[hereinafter
DRUG
REBATE
PROGRAM],
available
at
https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-information/bytopics/benefits/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebate-program.html.
102. See generally, U.S. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., Medicaid Eligibility,
MEDICAID.GOV (last updated Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaidchip-program-information/by-topics/benefits/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drugrebate-program.html.
103. See DRUG REBATE PROGRAM, supra note 102.
104. Id.
FACTS,
105. See
Obamacare
Medicaid
Expansion,
OBAMACARE
http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacares-medicaid-expansion (last visited Feb.
14, 2016).
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this number had grown to 64.9 million individuals, or twenty percent of the
U.S. population. 106 State Medicaid data indicates that manufacturers paid
in excess of $16.7 billion in Medicaid rebates in 2012. 107
2. 340B Program

The 340B program, created by Congress in 1992, requires drug
manufacturers to provide outpatient drugs at significantly reduced prices
to 340B-qualified buyers. 108 Qualified buyers generally include publichealth clinics serving uninsured and low-income patients and
disproportionate-share hospitals whose patient populations include a high
proportion of low-income patients. 109 However, since the 340B program’s
inception, the eligibility requirements have greatly expanded. 110
Specifically, the ACA broadened the definition of eligible entities to include
many additional types of hospitals. 111 Moreover, mergers between 340B
providers and non-340B providers have further expanded the list of
qualified buyers. 112 As a result, both the number of 340B-eligible hospitals
and the money spent on 340B drugs tripled between 2005 and 2014. 113 By
2014, there were over 14,000 hospitals and affiliated sites in the 340B
program, representing about one-third of all U.S. hospitals. 114
As previously discussed, drug manufacturers that participate in
Medicaid must enter into an agreement to sell drugs at a discount under
the 340B program. 115 Like the Medicaid discount, the 340B discounted price
106. See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., 2014 CMS STATISTICS (2014), available at
https://www.cms.gov/Research-Statistics-Data-and-Systems/Statistics-Trendsand-Reports/CMS-Statistics-ReferenceBooklet/Downloads/CMS_Stats_2014_final.pdf.
107. DANIEL R. LEVINSON, OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, OEI-03-13-00659, MEDICAID REBATES
FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS EXCEEDED PART D REBATES BY A SUBSTANTIAL MARGIN, at 6 (2015).
108. Veteran’s Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-585, 106 Stat. § 602 (amended
Public Health Servs. Act to include § 340B).
109. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: OVERVIEW OF THE 340B
DRUG PRICING PROGRAM, at vii (2015).
110. John McManus, The 340B Program is in Dire Need of Reform, LIFE SCI. LEADER (Apr.
26,
2013),
http://www.lifescienceleader.com/docpreview/the-b-discountprogram-is-in-dire-need-of-reform-0001/d42503b6-2543-4dce-a789a1ac008dd9b6.
111. Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §7101, 124 Stat. 259 (2010).
112. Aaron Vandervelde, Director, Berkeley Research Group, Presentation: 340B
Covered Entity Acquisitions of Physician-based Oncology Practices, at 3 (Apr. 22,
2014),
available
at
http://www.thinkbrg.com/media/publication/449_340B%20Physicianbased%20Oncology%20Practice%20Acquisitions.pdf.
113. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 109, at 10-12.
114. Id. at 4.
115. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., Medicaid Drug Rebate Program, MEDICAID.GOV
(last updated Feb. 15, 2017), https://www.medicaid.gov/medicaid-chip-program-
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is set relative to the AMP, and must be at least a 23.1 percent discount. 116
However, the statutory formula calculates different discounts for different
products and is estimated to produce discounts that average forty-five
percent off the AMP. 117 Moreover, the formulas can result in a negative
340B selling price for a drug, in which case the Health Resources and
Services Administration (“HRSA”) instructs manufacturers to set the drug
price at a penny. 118
HRSA estimates that covered entities saved $3.8 billion on outpatient
drugs through the program in fiscal year 2013. 119 Unfortunately, many of
these savings are not reaching low-income patients. The 340B statute does
not require that providers only dispense 340B drugs to needy patients. 120
Instead, providers may purchase 340B drugs at a steep discount, sell them
to non-qualified patients, and pocket the difference between the 340B
discounted price and the reimbursement from the non-qualified patients’
private insurance companies. 121 Indeed, a recent study by the U.S.
Government Accountability Office found that about half of the 340B
entities in the study generated revenue from private insurer
reimbursements that exceeded 340B prices. 122 As an example, Duke
University Hospital, a 340B hospital, generated $48.3 million in 2012 by
selling 340B discounted drugs to its patients, two-thirds of whom are
privately insured. 123
3. Departments of Defense and Veterans Affairs Drug Programs

The DOD and VA are also major purchasers of prescription drugs. In
2012, the DOD and VA spent $11.8 billion to purchase drugs on behalf of

information/by-topics/benefits/prescription-drugs/medicaid-drug-rebateprogram.html.
116. David H. Howard et al., Pricing in the Market for Anticancer Drugs, 29 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 139, 156 (2015).
117. McManus, supra note 110.
118. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-836, DRUG PRICING: MANUFACTURER DISCOUNTS
IN THE 340B PROGRAM OFFER BENEFITS, BUT FEDERAL OVERSIGHT NEEDS IMPROVEMENT, at 11
n.31 (2011); Id. at 21 (Stating, “one manufacturer reported that after the price of
an oral contraceptive dropped to a penny as a result of HRSA’s penny pricing
policy, it received an order from a covered entity that exceeded the
manufacturer’s current national supply by 50 percent.”).
119. MEDICARE PAYMENT ADVISORY COMM’N, supra note 109, at vii.
120. See Lauren Flynn Kelly, 340B Program Shirks Charitable Care, Undermines
HEALTH
(Apr.
4,
2014),
Formularies,
Argue
PBMs,
AIS
https://aishealth.com/archive/ndbn040414-02.
121. See id.
122. GAO-11-836, supra note 119, at 13.
123. McManus, supra note 111.
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approximately 18.5 million active-duty and retired military personnel, their
dependents, and eligible veterans. 124
In order to sell drugs through Medicaid, drug manufacturers must also
provide drugs to four government agencies—the VA, DOD, Public Health
Service, and Coast Guard—at statutorily-imposed discounts. 125 Drug
manufacturers must provide certain drugs to these agencies at the lesser of
(1) a twenty-four percent discount off the AMP offered to non-federal
sources or (2) the lowest price manufacturers charge their most-favored
nonfederal customers under comparable terms. 126 Both the DOD and the
VA also use prescription drug formularies to lower prices even further
below the statutorily-required discounts. 127 Moreover, the agencies enter
into national contracts to provide additional pricing concessions from
specific vendors. 128 The most recent estimate of the price savings from the
combination of these efforts indicates that VA and DOD pricing for brand
pharmaceuticals was approximately forty-one to forty-two percent of the
average wholesale price (“AWP”). 129
4. Medicare Part D

The Medicare Modernization Act of 2003 added an optional Medicare
prescription drug benefit, Medicare Part D, to offer coverage to many of the
nation’s retirees and disabled persons. 130 In 2015, more than thirty-nine
million beneficiaries were enrolled in Medicare Part D plans. 131 The Part D
plans are actually private plans that receive payments from the government
to provide Medicare-subsidized drug coverage for enrollees.
Unlike Medicaid and the 340B program, there is no statutory rebate
level on prescription drugs covered under the program. Instead, the private
Medicare Part D plans, acting on behalf of the Medicare program, negotiate
prices with pharmaceutical manufacturers and may obtain price

124. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-358, PRESCRIPTION DRUGS: COMPARISON
DOD AND VA DIRECT PURCHASE PRICES 1 (Apr. 2013).

OF

125. Veterans Health Care Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-585, 106 Stat. 4971, §603(a)(1),
(4 Nov. 1992).
126. PHRMA, CHART PACK: BIOPHARMACEUTICALS
VETERAN AFFAIRS 68 (2012).

IN

MEDICARE, MEDICAID & DEPARTMENT

OF

127. See id.
128. GAO-13-358, supra note 118, at 4.
129. U.S.CONG. BUDGET OFF., PRICES FOR BRAND-NAME DRUGS UNDER SELECTED FEDERAL PROGRAMS
9 (2005).
130. See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1305 (2003).
131. Jack Hoadley et al., Medicare Part D at Ten Years: The 2015 Marketplace and Key
Trends 2006-2015, HENRY KAISER FAMILY FOUND. 6 (Oct. 5, 2015),
http://files.kff.org/attachment/report-medicare-part-d-at-ten-years-the-2015marketplace-and-key-trends-2006-2015.
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concessions in the form of rebates. 132 Manufacturers are willing to offer
significant rebates and discounts in order to provide drugs to the millions
of covered participants. According to Medicare Trustees, a board that
reports annually to Congress on the financial operations of Medicare, the
rebates often amount to as much as a twenty- to thirty-percent discount on
brand medicines. 133 Manufacturers paid in excess of $10.3 billion in Part D
rebates in 2012. 134
In addition to the significant discounts negotiated by the private plans,
the Medicare Part D program does include direct price controls on drugs
sold in the coverage gap. The coverage gap (or “donut hole”) is a spending
level at which enrollees are responsible for a larger share of their total drug
costs than they are at below or above this level. For 2016, the coverage gap
begins when the individual and the plan have spent $3310 on covered drugs
and ends when they have spent $7515. 135 Medicare Part D requires brand
drug manufacturers to offer fifty-percent discounts on drugs sold during the
coverage gap. 136 These discounts will cost drug manufacturers
approximately forty-one billion dollars between 2012 and 2021. 137
5. State Price-Control Initiatives

In addition to the federal regulations and programs discussed above,
states are currently considering their own price controls. The California
Drug Price Relief Act, which appeared on the state’s November 2016 ballot,
would have prohibited state agencies from paying more for a drug than the
price at which the drug is sold under the federal VA drug program. 138 A

132. BOARD OF TR. OF FED. HOSP. INS. & FED. SUPPLEMENTARY MED. TR. FUNDS, ANNUAL REPORT 166
(2012).
133. Id. at 165, n.72.
134. LEVINSON, supra note 107, at 6.
135. See CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Costs in the Coverage Gap, MEDICARE.GOV,
https://www.medicare.gov/part-d/costs/coverage-gap/part-d-coveragegap.html (last visited Apr. 1, 2017).
136. See id.; CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERV., Part D Information for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers, CMS.GOV, https://www.cms.gov/Medicare/Prescription-DrugCoverage/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/Pharma.html.
137. PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS HEALTH RESEARCH INST., Implications of the US Supreme
Court Ruling on Healthcare, PWC 6 (June 2012), http://pwchealth.com/cgilocal/hregister.cgi/reg/implications-of-the-US-Supreme-Court-ruling-onhealthcare.pdf.
138. Letter from Michael Weinstein, to Ashley Johansson, Initiative Coordinator, Office
of
the
Attorney
General
(Apr.
3,
2015),
available
at
https://oag.ca.gov/system/files/initiatives/pdfs/150009%20(Prescription%20Drug%20Costs).pdf.
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similar measure in Ohio, the Ohio Drug Price Relief Act, 139 will appear on
the November 2017 ballot. 140
B.

Likely Consequences of Further Price Controls

Although the existing price controls lower prices for some consumers,
they likely result in increased prices for others. Many of the required
rebates under Medicaid, the 340B program, and VA and DOD programs are
based on drugs’ AMP. Calculating rebates from average drug prices gives
manufacturers an incentive to set higher prices to wholesalers and
pharmacies in order to offset discounts. 141 Moreover, with at least forty
percent of drugs sold under price controls, and some programs even
requiring drugs to be sold for a penny, 142 manufacturers are forced to sell
many drugs at significant discounts. This creates incentives to charge higher
prices to other, non-covered patients to offset the discounts. Indeed,
numerous academic studies and government analyses have concluded that
required discounts under Medicaid and Medicare have resulted in
increased prices for other consumers as manufacturers offset the revenue
lost under price controls. 143 Further price controls will only amplify these
incentives.
If manufacturers are not able to offset discounts by increasing prices
for non-covered consumers, all consumers may ultimately suffer. Basic
economic principles predict that price controls result in drug shortages; at
a below-market price, the demand for drugs exceeds the amount of drugs
that manufacturers are willing to sell. Indeed, recent research suggests that

139. See petition from Donald J. McTigue, Attorney, McTigue McGinnis & Colombo LLC,
to Mike DeWine, Attorney General, Ohio (Jul. 22, 2015), available at
http://www.ohioattorneygeneral.gov/getattachment/8592c88b-fa92-4c66-a92a383c8862b53b/Ohio-Drug-Price-Relief-Act.aspx.
140. Letter from Jon Husted, Sec’y State, Ohio, to Donald J. McTique, Partner, McTigue
& McGinnis LLC (Sept. 30, 2016), available at https://www.aidshealth.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/10/Supplementary-Petition-SOS-Certification.pdf.
141. Howard et al., supra note 116, at 156.
142. See U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. HEALTH RESOURCES & SERV. ADMIN, NO. 2011-2,
CLARIFICATION OF PENNY PRICING POLICY (2011).
143. See, e.g. Mark Duggan & Fiona M. Scott Morton, The Distortionary Effects of
Government Procurement: Evidence from Medicaid Prescription Drug Purchasing,
121 Q. J. ECON. 1, 1 (2006); Howard et al., supra note 117, at 140; CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, HOW THE MEDICAID REBATE ON PRESCRIPTION DRUGS AFFECTS PRICING IN THE
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 2 (1996); GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-94-194FS,
CHANGES IN BEST PRICE FOR OUTPATIENT DRUGS PURCHASED BY HMOS AND HOSPITALS 2 (1994);
Jim Hahn, Federal Drug Price Negotiation: Implications for Medicare Part D, CONG.
RES.
SERV.
(Apr.
19,
2007),
http://congressionalresearch.com/RL33782/document.php?study=Federal+Drug
+Price+Negotiation+Implications+for+Medicare+Part+D.

337

Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017
The Prescription for Rising Drug Prices: Competition or Price Controls?

price controls in the U.S. pharmaceutical industry have created drug
shortages. 144
In addition, price controls may prevent many companies from earning
profits sufficient to offset their R&D costs or the risk of failure. This could
slow innovation, negatively impacting long-term health outcomes.
Moreover, if other countries’ experiences are any indication, lower profits
will likely curtail generic competition. 145 A less-competitive pharmaceutical
industry will, in turn, reduce choices, innovation, and, ironically, increase
drug spending.
As previously discussed, brand companies incur an average of $2.6
billion in costs to bring each drug to market with FDA approval. 146 They must
offset these significant costs before generic competition destroys brand
profits; within three months of the first generic entry, generics have already
captured over seventy percent of the brand drugs’ market, and within
twelve months, brand companies retain less than twenty percent of their
original market share. 147 As a result, brand companies have a very limited
window during which they can earn revenues sufficient to offset the
significant costs of R&D, not to mention the production, operating,
marketing, and distributional costs of selling a drug. In fact, research
indicates that the average window of exclusivity during which companies
can earn significant revenues is less than thirteen years. 148 Selling drugs at
too low a price during this window will result in significant losses for drug
companies.
Furthermore, brand companies must price a drug not only to recoup
the drug’s own costs; they must also consider the costs of all the product
failures in their pricing decisions. Only about ten percent of drugs that begin
clinical trials are eventually approved by the FDA. 149 Moreover, even the ten
percent of drugs that receive FDA approval are not all commercial
successes. Data indicate that only twenty percent of marketed brand drugs
will ever earn enough sales to cover their development costs. 150 The other
eighty percent of approved drugs generate losses for drug makers.
Thus, if only ten percent of drugs are approved and twenty percent of
those are able to recoup costs, then only one in fifty drugs developed by
144. See David B. Ridley et al., No Shot: US Vaccine Prices And Shortages, 35 HEALTH AFF.
235, Abstract (2016); Brian Rye, Medicare Price Controls Worsen Drug Shortages,
Boost Gray Market, BLOOMBERG GOV’T STUDY (Oct. 1, 2012),
http://glacialblog.com/userfiles/76/BGov_Drug_Shortage_Report(2).pdf.
145. See INT’L TRADE ASS’N, U.S. DEP’T COM., PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS
COUNTRIES 21 (2004); Grabowski et al., supra note 32, at 7.
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146. GRABOWSKI & HANSEN, supra note 13, at 5.
147. Grabowski et al., supra note 32, at 7.
148. Id.
149. Hay et al., supra note 14, at 40-41. (using data from 2003-2011 and including both
new drug applications and biologic license applications).
150. Vernon et al., supra note 66, at 1004.
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brand companies is a winner that earns positive profits. The price of these
winners must not just recoup their own costs, they must also help recoup
the costs of the forty-nine out of fifty drugs that never earn a profit. Failure
to cover the losers’ costs will slow investment in R&D; drug companies will
not spend millions and billions of dollars developing drugs if they cannot
recoup the costs of that development.
Less R&D spending will, in turn, result in less innovation throughout the
industry. A substantial body of empirical literature establishes a direct
relationship between pharmaceutical firms’ profitability, research and
development efforts, and innovation. Numerous studies have found that
policies that increase pharmaceutical profitability lead to increases in new
clinical trials, new molecular entities, and new drug offerings. 151 Other
studies have found that policies that reduce expected profitability lead to
decreases in R&D spending. 152 Indeed, the U.S. Department of Commerce
confirms a “close correlation between revenues, cash flow, and profit
margins on the one hand and R&D expenditures on the other.” 153 Thus, if
price controls force brand companies to operate in a way that reduces
profitability over the long term, the result will be less innovation in the
pharmaceutical market.
Consumers will suffer from reductions in innovation. Research shows
that pharmaceutical innovation has produced significant health benefits to
consumers. Empirical estimates of the benefits of pharmaceutical
innovation indicate that each new drug brought to market saves 11,200 lifeyears each year. 154 Another study finds that the health improvements from
each new drug can eliminate nineteen billion dollars in lost wages by
preventing lost work due to illness. 155 Additionally, because new effective
drugs reduce medical spending on doctor visits, hospitalizations, and other
medical procedures, data show that for every incremental dollar spent on
new drugs, total medical spending decreases by more than seven dollars. 156
151. See Duggan & Morton, supra note 143, at 7; Amy Finkelstein, Static and Dynamic
Effects of Health Policy: Evidence from the Vaccine Industry, 119 Q. J. ECON. 527,
527 (2004); Daron Acemoglu & Joshua Linn, Market Size in Innovation: Theory and
Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry, 119 Q. J. ECON. 1049, 1049 (2004).
152. Joseph Golec et al., Pharmaceutical R&D Spending and Threats of Price Regulation,
45 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 239, 239 (2010); Frank R. Lichtenberg, Public Policy
and Innovation in the U.S. Pharmaceutical Industry, in PUBLIC POLICY AND THE
ECONOMICS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 83, 102, 105-106 (D. Holtz-Eakin & H. S. Rosen eds.,
2004).
153. INT’L TRADE ASS’N, U.S. DEP’T COM., supra note 145, at 25.
154. See generally FRANK R. LICHTENBERG & NAT’L BUREAU ECON. RESEARCH, PHARMACEUTICAL
INNOVATION, MORTALITY REDUCTION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH (1998), available at
http://www.nber.org/papers/w6569.
155. Craig Garthwaite, The Economic Benefits of Pharmaceutical Innovations: The Case
of Cox-2 Inhibitors, 4 APPLIED ECON. 116 (2012).
156. Frank R. Lichtenberg, Benefits and Costs of Newer Drugs: An Update, 28
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 485, 485 (2007).
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Brand companies, and the profit incentives that motivate them, are largely
responsible for pharmaceutical innovation. Thus, actions that reduce brand
innovation will have long-term negative effects on consumer health and
healthcare spending.
Finally, lower profitability will likely reduce competition in the
pharmaceutical industry. Generic entry, like the market entry of suppliers
in any industry, depends on potential profits. Indeed, several examples
illustrate the relationship between profits and generic entry. First, the
substantial profit potential under the Hatch-Waxman 180-day exclusivity
period has led to a significant increase in generic challenges. 157 Second,
generics race to enter the market upon brand-patent expiry to claim a share
of brand drugs’ market share and profits before the market is saturated
with generic competitors. 158 Conversely, in periods when few patents are
expiring, the existing profits available in the market are much lower and
fewer generics enter. 159 Finally, foreign countries that utilize price controls
to control drug prices have significantly less generic competition; without
the profit potential, fewer generics enter the international markets. 160
Currently, the U.S. market has more generic competition than any
other market, largely because of the significant profit potential for these
firms. 161 However, additional price controls will lead to reductions in
generic entry. This reduction in generic competition will reduce consumers’
choices of drugs and increase drug prices. Although price controls will
require set discounts from average prices, without generic competition,
these average prices will be much higher than they would be with more
competition. Similarly, intensely competitive markets spur innovation as
firms innovate to gain market share and outdo competitors. If price controls
lead to a less-competitive market, incentives to innovate will also decline.

IV. Facilitating Competition in Pharmaceuticals
Instead of imposing price controls, there are many actions the
government could take to increase competition in the pharmaceutical
industry. By increasing competition, these actions will expand product
offerings, giving consumers more choice in the drugs they take. They will
also lower prices as suppliers compete to attain or protect valuable market
share from rivals. Finally, increased competition will lead to more
innovation as drug companies strive to create new products to stay ahead

157. Henry G. Grabowski & John M. Vernon, Brand Loyalty, Entry, and Price
Competition in Pharmaceuticals After the 1984 Drug Act, 35 J. L. & ECON. 331
(1992).
158. Id. at 334.
159. Thomas, supra note 37.
160. U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, PHARMACEUTICAL PRICE CONTROLS IN OECD COUNTRIES 21 (2004).
161. Id. at ix.
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of competitors. Below, I discuss several actions the government could take
relatively quickly to increase competition in the pharmaceutical industry.
A.

Reduce Generic Approval Backlog at the FDA

The single most important factor in controlling drug spending in recent
decades has been the dramatic increase in generic-drug usage. Generic
drugs saved consumers $254 billion in 2014 and $1.68 trillion over the past
decade. 162 The degree to which generics reduce drug prices depends on the
number of generic competitors in the market; the more competitors, the
more prices face downward pressure. Unfortunately, a backlog of generic
drug approvals at the FDA has restricted generic competition in many
important market segments.
In 2012, Congress enacted the Generic Drug User Fee Act to provide the
FDA with funds from generic-drug makers to ensure a speedy FDA approval
process for generic drugs. 163 Despite this, in January 2016, there were over
3500 generic applications pending approval. 164 Moreover, according to the
chairman of the Senate health committee, the approval process is taking
longer for generic drugs; the median approval time was thirty months in
2012, compared to forty-eight months in 2016. 165
Both the backlog of generics awaiting approval and the lengthy
approval times are hindering generic entry and restricting the price drops
that typically occur with increased competition. The price drop after generic
entry depends on the number of generics entering the market; more
generics mean a more significant decline in prices. Indeed, estimates
suggest that by the time there are six or more competitors for a generic
drug, the generic price has dropped to about ten percent of the brand
price. 166 Yet many drugs have only a few generic competitors and, as a
result, consumers do not enjoy the savings that would be possible with
more generic entry. 167

162. GENERIC PHARMACEUTICAL ASSOC., GENERIC DRUG SAVINGS IN THE U.S. 1 (2015), available at
http://www.gphaonline.org/media/wysiwyg/PDF/GPhA_Savings_Report_2015.p
df.
163. Generic Drug User Fee Amendments of 2012, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993,
Title III.
164. Alexander: Despite Extra $1 Billion to Speed Generic Drug Approvals, FDA Process
Still Too Slow, U.S. SENATE COMM. ON HEALTH, ED., LABOR & PENSIONS (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.help.senate.gov/chair/newsroom/press/alexander-despite-extra-1billion-to-speed-generic-drug-approvals-fda-process-still-too-slow.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. Zachary Brennan, FDA’s Woodcock: Generic Drug Application Backlog will be
Eliminated before GDUFA II, REGULATORY AFFAIRS PROF’LS SOC’Y (Jan. 28, 2016),
http://www.raps.org/RegulatoryFocus/News/2016/01/28/24195/FDA%E2%80%99s-Woodcock-Generic-DrugApplication-Backlog-Will-be-Eliminated-Before-GDUFA-II/.
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Congress is currently pressuring the FDA to reduce this backlog and
promote generic entry. 168 Enhanced efforts will facilitate generic
competition and, in turn, reduce drug prices and lower consumers’
spending on medications.
B.

Expedite Biosimilars Approval

Recognizing the expansion in biologic drugs and the growing
importance of affordable biosimilar alternatives, Congress provided an
expedited FDA approval pathway for biosimilars under the Biologics Price
Competition and Innovation Act (“BPCIA”) of the ACA. 169 Under BPCIA, a
proposed biologic substitute does not have to demonstrate bioequivalence,
but merely biosimilarity, to a reference product. 170 A product approved as
biosimilar may further be deemed interchangeable with another biologic if
its manufacturer can demonstrate that switching between the reference
biologic and the proposed substitute presents no additional risk in safety or
efficacy for consumers. 171 Importantly, under federal law, interchangeable
products may be substituted for reference biologics without a prescribing
doctor’s intervention. 172 However, BPCIA vests with the FDA broad
discretion in determining biosimilarity; the FDA may rely on various
studies—or waive these requirements173—make rules, 174 issue guidance, or
even categorically ban biosimilar applications for classes of biologics. 175
Despite BPCIA’s charge to the FDA, the FDA has proven surprisingly
tentative in promoting biosimilar approval. As of January 2016, it had
approved only three biosimilars for use in the U.S. despite several pending
biosimilar applications. 176 The FDA has also yet to provide any meaningful
guidance as to what standards the agency will employ in determining
whether a biosimilar is interchangeable with a biologic. 177 Burdensome
requirements for interchangeability will increase the difficulty and cost of
biosimilar approval. Moreover, many states require biosimilars to be
deemed interchangeable before they can be automatically substituted for
their biologic counterpart at pharmacies. 178 A high hurdle for what
constitutes interchangeability will limit automatic substitution of affordable
168. Gilchrist, supra note 11.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2)(B) (2016).
170. Id.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(3) (2016).
172. Id.
173. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) (2016).
174. Id.
175. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(8)(E) (2016).
176. Brennan, supra note 81.
177. Brennan, supra note 82.
178. Id.
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biosimilars and, in turn, greatly reduce the savings possible from biosimilar
competition.
American consumers stand to benefit significantly from BPCIA’s
biosimilar-approval pathway. Consumers currently spend over sixty-six
billion dollars a year on high-priced biologic drugs. 179 In 2014, ten biologics
with over three billion dollars in annual sales were on the list of the toptwenty-five selling drugs, and seven of the top eight best-selling drugs were
biologics. 180 Many biologic drugs are currently prohibitively expensive for
consumers. The average cost of a biologic drug is twenty-two times greater
than a traditional drug. 181 Moreover, by requiring large patient coinsurance
for specialty drugs, such as biologics, most consumers’ prescription-drug
insurance coverage fails to fully defray these massive costs. 182 As a result,
many consumers cannot afford to obtain these life-saving or life-enhancing
drugs.
Expediting the approval of biosimilars will increase competition in the
market for biologic drugs, reducing prices and allowing more patients
access to these treatments. Evidence from Europe reveals that biosimilars
have stimulated market competition, reducing prices and saving consumers
between fifteen billion dollars and forty-five billion dollars from 2007 to
2020. 183 Many expensive biologics stand to soon go off-patent in the U.S.,
opening the door for competition from cheaper biosimilars. 184 As a result,
estimates suggest that a biosimilar-approval pathway at the FDA will save
U.S. consumers between forty-four billion dollars185 and $250 billion 186 over
the next decade.
179. Andrew W. Mulcahy et al., The Cost Savings Potential of Biosimilar Drugs in the
United
States,
RAND
CORP.
7
(2014),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE127/RAN
D_PE127.pdf.
180. B. Sargent, 10 Biologics on Best Selling Drugs List for 2014, CELL CULTURE DISH (Mar.
19, 2015), http://cellculturedish.com/2015/03/10-biologics-on-best-sellingdrugs-list-for-2014/.
181. So & Katz, supra note 17.
182. Purvis, supra note 77, at slides 8-12.
183. Sumant Ramachandra, Lessons for the United States: Biosimilar Market
Development
Worldwide,
at
slide
13
(Feb.
4,
2014),
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/FollowOn%20Biologics%20Workshop%3A%20Impact%20of%20Recent%20Legislative%
20and%20Regulatory%20Naming%20Proposals%20on%20Competition/ramacha
ndra.pdf.
184. FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG
COMPETITION
4
(2009),
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-healthcare-issues-follow-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commissionreport/p083901biologicsreport.pdf.
185. Mulcahy et al., supra note 179, at 13.
186. Miller, supra note 80, at slide 7.
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C.

Prohibit Anticompetitive Practices

In addition to promoting more competition, courts and lawmakers can
do more to prohibit anticompetitive behaviors. Like promoting generic and
biosimilar entry, preventing anticompetitive practices will increase
competition in the pharmaceutical industry and lower prices. Although an
in-depth discussion of anticompetitive practices in the pharmaceutical
industry is beyond the scope of this article, recent investigations and
regulatory actions suggest that a few new practices may be low-hanging
fruit that could be easily targeted. Below I provide a few examples.
First, some product-switching cases may be targets for increased
enforcement. These cases arise when brand companies decide to shift their
marketing efforts away from drugs about to go off-patent and toward a new
drug that can serve as a substitute for the expiring drug. Much of this
behavior is the predictable business response to the incentives created by
patent law and state substitution laws. As previously discussed, developing
a drug and obtaining FDA approval costs an average of $2.6 billion and the
patent period provides a very limited window during which companies can
charge higher prices to recoup these exorbitant costs. As the patent period
expires, brand companies typically lose eighty to ninety percent of their
sales to generic versions of the drug under state substitution laws that allow
or even require pharmacists to automatically substitute a generic
equivalent drug when a patient presents a prescription for a brand drug. 187
Instead of continuing to market drugs after the patent period expires and
handing over eighty to ninety percent of their sales to generic competitors,
brand companies often decide to shift their marketing efforts to a new drug
that can serve as a substitute for the drug about to go off-patent.
As I have argued in prior work, 188 many product-switching cases are not
anticompetitive because it is within patent holders’ rights to stop marketing
a drug during its patent period, and removing an obsolete product from
market when there is a new and improved version is not consumer
coercion. Furthermore, marketing a new product that is still under patent
does not prevent consumers from switching to generic versions of the prior
drug and does not bar generics from several existing cost-efficient means
of distribution. However, certain product-switching behavior may give rise
to valid anticompetitive claims. Sometimes, the shift in marketing effort
from a drug facing patent expiry to a substitute is accompanied by other
wrongful and fraudulent behavior intended to coerce consumers. Examples
include cases where the manufacturers fabricate safety concerns or falsely
disparage the original drug to drive consumers to the new substitute. 189
187. New York v. Actavis PLC, 787 F.3d 638, 647 (2d Cir. 2015).
188. Joanna Shepherd, Deterring Innovation: NY v. Actavis and the Duty to Subsidize
Competitors’ Market Entry, 17 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH. 2 (2016).
189. In re: Suboxone (Buprenorphine Hydrochloride and Naxolone) Antitrust Litigation,
64 F.Supp.3d 665, 681 (E.D. Pa. 2014) (plaintiffs also alleged that defendants
falsely disparaged the tablet through fabricated safety concerns); Abbott Labs. v.
Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., 432 F.Supp.2d 408 (D. Del. 2006) (denying defendant’s
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Other examples include cases where the manufacturer’s new drug is
nothing but a sham innovation that does not justify shifts in marketing
effort or redirecting consumers. 190 Enforcing actions against these and
similar anticompetitive practices in product-switching cases will facilitate
generic entry and, in turn, lower drug prices.
Abuse of the FDA’s Risk Evaluation and Mitigation Strategies (“REMS”)
program is another area in which enhanced enforcement could increase
competition. The FDA introduced REMS in 2007 to augment the agency’s
post-approval authority over drugs and ensure that a drug’s benefits exceed
its risks. 191 The FDA requires REMS for drugs that need additional
communication with prescribers, pharmacists, or patients to manage any
risks or safety concerns associated with a drug. 192 For many drugs, REMS
restrict distribution and prescribing practices and require additional
recordkeeping by prescribers and pharmacists. Nearly forty percent of new
drugs are subject to REMS restrictions. 193
Unfortunately, generic manufacturers now claim that some brand
manufacturers are using REMS to thwart generic entry. They argue that
brand companies point to REMS’ restrictive distribution requirements to
deny generic manufacturers access to the product samples they need to
receive FDA approval. For example, the now-notorious Martin Shkreli and
Turing Pharmaceuticals allegedly restricted the distribution of
pyrimethamine to a single source to make it more difficult for generic
competitors to obtain samples needed for bioequivalence testing. 194
Both the Federal Trade Commission and Congress launched
investigations into Turing for possible antitrust violations when the

motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs alleged that defendant twice tweaked the drug
formulation to prevent automatic generic substitution and removed the prior
formulations from the National Drug Data File to prevent pharmacies from filling
prescriptions for the older versions and their generic counterparts).
190. JOSHUA D. WRIGHT & DOUGLAS H. GINSBURG, THE CANADIAN COMPETITION BUREAU’S DRAFT
UPDATED INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES 1 (2015), available at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/734661/15081
0canadacomment.pdf (“We respectfully recommend against imposing a
competition law sanction on product switching absent clear and convincing
objective evidence that Product B represents a sham innovation with zero or
negative consumer welfare benefits.”).
191. Jordan Paradise, REMS as a Competitive Tactic: Is Big Pharma Hijacking Drug
Access and Patient Safety?, 15 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 43, 57 (2015).
192. Id. at 57.
193. Darren S. Tucker et al., REMS: The Next Pharmaceutical Enforcement Priority?, 28
ANTITRUST 74, 74 (2014).
194. Michael Carrier & Aaron Kesselheim, The Daraprim Price Hike and a Role for
AFF.
BLOG
(Oct.,
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2015),
Antitrust,
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http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2015/10/21/the-daraprim-price-hike-and-a-rolefor-antitrust/.
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restricted distribution of pyrimethamine was accompanied by a 5000
percent price increase. 195
Courts have yet to rule on whether restrictive distribution under REMS
can constitute anticompetitive conduct. 196 However, Congress is currently
considering proposals to prevent any abuses. 197 While limiting distribution
to ensure that risky products are sold and used safely is what the FDA
intended with the REMS program, using the program to limit generic entry
harms competition and increases prices for pharmaceuticals. Courts and
lawmakers should be cautious in striking the right balance between
ensuring drug safety on the one hand and facilitating competition on the
other.

V.

Conclusion

Recent surges in drug spending have provoked anger and prompted
calls for reform. However, policy makers should understand the full
consequences of intervention in the pharmaceutical industry before acting.
Reforms calling for new price controls could impose harms on consumers
that outweigh any benefits that they provide through lower prices. Basic
economic principles, past experience, and empirical data indicate that new
price controls will likely increase drug prices for some consumers, slow
pharmaceutical innovation, curtail generic competition, and reduce
consumer choice. In contrast, reforms aimed at promoting competition or
prohibiting anticompetitive practices will lower pharmaceutical prices and
drug spending without these deleterious effects.
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2016),
Scrutiny,
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